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as to the present status of the rule. It is one of due care under the
circumstances. The elements of "outrunning headlights," i.e., the speed
of the vehicle as related to the range of the headlights and the effective-
ness of the brake mechanism, are simply considered as relatively impor-
tant factors in determining the presence or absence of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. Since the bare fact of a collision would
in most cases give rise to an inference that plaintiff was "outrunning
his headlights," it seems that the only effective means of withstanding
a demurrer or nonsuit is a careful marshalling of facts that tend to show
extenuating circumstances in the particular case. 9 Facts having a bear-
ing of importance for this purpose have been indicated by a recent
note.' 0
A comparison with the status of the rule, or its equivalent, in other
jurisdictions" indicates that the North Carolina Supreme Court has
taken a sensible approach to a -difficult problem which is of importance
to many North Carolina motorists. In the light of recent decisions, the
following statement seems to be indicative of the court's attitude toward
'oti&unning headlights":
One must operate a motor vehicle at night in a manner that will
,enable him to avoid striking objects that, by the exercise of rea-
sonable care, he should perceive or anticipate as they come within
the range of the headlights of his vehicle.
JOHN R. MONTGOMERY, JR.
Bailments-Validity of Contract Limiting Liability for Negligence
Automobile owner contracted with defendant parking lot operator
for parking privileges,' the parties agreeing orally2 that defendant would
' The situation here is similar to the doctrine enunciated by the court that, the
failure of a motorist to stop at a point where a clear view may be had of railroad
tracks before crossing them is contributory negligence as a matter of law. Parker
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 232 N. C. 472, 61 S. E. 2d 370 (1950). It is interest-
ing to note that this doctrine appeared in North Carolina in 1927, the same year
as the rule of "outrunning headlights." Harrison v. North Carolina R. R., 194 N. C.
656, 140 S. E. 598 (1927). The rigid doctrine is generally considered to be the
result of Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66 (1927). But, by the
recognition of "modifying factors," the North Carolina Court has, for most pur-
poses, transformed the doctrine into a standard of reasonable care. See Note, 29
N. C. L. REv. 301 (1951).
"Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 153 (1948).
"See cases cited in 58 A. L. R. 1493 (1929), 87 A. L. R. 900 (1933), 97 A. L. R.
546 (1944). In many states the rule is codified in "assured clear distance" statutes.
See Rich v. Petersen Truck Lines, 357 Pa. 318, 53 A. 2d 725 (1947) ; Smiley v.
Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N. E. 2d 3 (1941). For an extensive
discussion of the effects of the rule of "outrunning headlights," with citations to
cases from many jurisdictions, see Comment, 34 ILL. L. REV. 65 (1940).
'The car keys were turned over to defendant so that he might move it about
the lot as necessity demanded. Distinguish from instances where the owner keeps
the car keys and is merely lessee of his parking spot. In such case there is no
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not be liable for loss by theft or fire. While parked in defendant's lot,
the automobile was stolen. In an action for the value of the automo-
bile, the agreement was allowed as a defense, and judgment was for
defendant. The North Carolina Supreme Court granted a new trial,
holding the agreement void as violating public policy. The court recog-
nized that ordinary mutual benefit bailees may make such contracts, but
refused to allow such a contract where the bailee is a professional, and
holds himself out to the public on a uniform basis.3
This -decision stands alone in North Carolina as regards professional
bailees. It is supported, however, by analogous cases involving public
service corporations.4 Also, in the early case of Hanes v. Shapiro5 it
was indicated by way of dictum that this was the policy in North Caro-
lina. Dicta in succeeding cases reaffirmed this.
6
The validity of exculpatory agreements which relieve the bailee of
all liability for his own negligence has been questioned for some time.7
-
As pertains to ordinary mutual benefit bailees such contracts are gen-
erally held to be valid, if they violate no rule of public policy and if
there is no great disparity of bargaining power between the parties. 8
In recent years, the courts have differentiated between the ordinary mu-
tual benefit bailee, dealing with the public on an individual basis, and the
professional mutual benefit bailee, who deals with the public on a uni-
bailment because the lot operator acquires no dominion or control over the .car.
See Freeman v. Service Co.; 226 N. C. 736, 40 S. E. 2d 365 (1946).
-This note does not cover those cases where the exculpatory clause is pleaded
on the sole grounds that such limiting terms were displayed on signs or printed on
identification stubs. See Gwertzman, Contracts Limiting the Bailee's Liability, 299
INs. L. J. 1059 (1947) ; Note, 40 MicHr. L. REV. 897 (1942).
'Miller's Mutual Fire Insurance Assoc. v. Parker, 234 N. C. 20, 65 S. E. 2d
341 (1951).
' Slocumb v. Raleigh, C. & S. R.R., 165 N. C. 338, 81 S. E. 335 (1914) ; Single-
ton v. A. C. L. R.R., 203 N. C. 462, 166 S. E. 305 (1932). In the Singleton case
plaintiff bailor left cotton on defendant bailee's railroad station platform, not to be
shipped, and with no obligation to ship it. Plaintiff agreed that defendant was
exempt from liability for any negligent destruction. The court upheld the agree-
ment. Here the bailment was not in the performance of defendant's duties as a
common carrier, but was a special contract in which the public had no interest.
'168 N. C. 24, 29, 84 S. E. 33, 35 (1914).
' Sams v. Cochran, 188 N. C. 731, 735, 125 S. E. 626, 628 (1924) ; Cooke v.
Veneer Co., 169 N. C. 493, 494, 86 S. E. 289 (1915).
7Willis, The Right of Bailees to .Contract Against Liability for Negligence, 20
HARv. L. REv. 297 (1907) ; Notes, 40 MIcH. L. REv. 897 (1942), 86 U. PA. L. REv.
772 (1938).
8 "The parties may enlarge or diminsh their liability by special contract, pro-
vided, first, that the contract is not in violation of law or against public policy.
. anes v. Shapiro, 168 N. C. 24, 84 S. E. 33 (1914). Newport News Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co. v. United States, 34 F. 2d 100 (4th Cir.) cert. denied,
280 U. S. 599 (1929) ; Laurens v. Jenney's Inc., 770 Ohio App. 291, 66 N. E. 2d 777
(1945); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§574, 575 (1932); 6 WILLISTON. CONTRACrS,
§1751C (Rev. ed. 1938) ; Note, 175 A. L. R. 117 (1948). Some jurisdictions refuse
to allow such agreements in any case. Sporsom v. First National Bank, 133 Wash.
199, 233 Pac. 641 (1925) ; Gesford v. Star Van & Storage Co., 104 Neb. 453, 177
N. W. 794 (1920).
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form basis.9 The latter category is generally held to include parking
lots,'0 garages,"1 check rooms,' 2 and warehouses.' 3 Here, the majority
view seems to be that such an exculpatory agreement is void.14 This
is based on disparity of bargaining power,15 the public nature of the
undertaking,' 6 and, in some cases, on statutory interpretation.1 7 A
few jurisdictions take the position that such contracts do not violate any
public policy.I s Others uphold such agreements on the ground that the
' Notes, 40 MIcH. L. REv. 897, 899 (1942), 86 U. PA. L. REv. 772, 778 (1938);
Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 112 (1948)." Pallotta v. Hanna Parking Garage Co., 46 Ohio L. Abst. 18, 68 N. E. 2d 170
(1946) ; Note, 30 Ky. L. J. 325 (1942) ; See Notes, 131 A. L. R. 1175 (1941), 175
A. L. R. 12, 123 (1948).
" Scott Auto & Supply Co. v. McQueen, 111 Okla. 107, 226 Pac. 372 (1924);
See Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 128 (1948).
" Denver Union Terminal R. Co. v. Culliman, 72 Colo. 248, 210 Pac. 602
(1922) ; Note, 22 MIcH. L. REv. 154 (1923) ; Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 120 (1948).
" Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Kerr, 204 Ark. 238, 161 S. W. 2d 403 (1942);
Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 131 (1948).
"Parking Lots: Keenan Hotel Co. v. Funks, 93 Ind. App. 677, 177 N. E. 364
(1931) ; Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 40 Ohio L. Abst. 569, 56 N. E. 2d 687
(1943), aff'd, 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N. E. 2d 658 (1944) ; Baione v. Heavey, 103
Pa. Super. 529, 158 At. 181 (1932).
Garages: Parris v. Jaquith, 70 Colo. 63, 197 Pac. 750 (1920); Renfroe v.
Fouche, 26 Ga. App. 340, 106 S. E. 303 (1921) ; Wienberger v. Werremeyer, 224
Ill. App. 217 (1922); Gulf & S. T. R. Co. v. Sutton Motor Co., 12 La. App. 495,
126 So. 458 (1930) ; Nagaki v. Stockfleth, 141 Neb. 676, 4 N. W. 2d 766 (1942) ;
Scott Auto & Supply Co. v. McQueen, 111 Okla. 107, 226 Pac. 372 (1924) ; Simms
v. Sullivan, 100 Or. 487, 198 Pac. 240 (1921). Where the garage charges less than
the average because of such contract, the contract may be upheld. Automobile
Underwriters of America v. Langlin, 6 La. App. 67 (1927).
Check Rooms: Denver Union Terminal R. Co. v. Culliman, 72 Colo. 248, 210
Pac. 602 (1922). In this field the courts appear more inclined to uphold such
agreements, if they are expressly made. See Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 123 (1948).
Warehouses: Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Kerr, 204 Ark. 239, 161 S. W.
2d 408 (1942) ; England v. Lyon Fireproof Storage Co., 94 Cal. App. 562, 271
Pac. 532 (1928); Marlowe v. Conway Iron Works, 130 S. C. 256, 125 S. E. 569
(1924) ; Central Meat Market v. Longwell's Transfer, Inc., 62 S. W. 2d 87 (Tex.
Com. App. 1933). When warehousemen are concerned, the courts are practically
unanimous in holding that they shall not be allowed to make such contracts. See
Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 131 (1948).
See generally, 4 WILisTox, CONTRACTS §1065A (Rev. ed. 1936).
" See note 9 supra.
" Notes, 40 MICH. L. REv. 897, 899 (1942), 86 U. PA. L. REv. 772, 777 (1938);
Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 111 (1948).
"7 Section 3 of The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act reads: "A Warehouseman
may insert in a receipt . . . any other terms and conditions, provided that such
terms and conditions shall not . . . (b) In any wise impair his obligation to exer-
cise that degree of care . . .which a reasonably careful man would exercise in
regard to similar goods of his own." In cases arising under this statute it has
been held that public policy -would be violated by allowing an exculpatory clause.
Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. Defense Supplies Corp., 164 F. 2d 773 (9th Cir.
1947) ; Morse v. Imperial Grain & Warehouse Co., 40 Cal. App. 574, 181 Pac. 815
(1919) ; Renfroe v. Fouche, 26 Ga. App. 340, 106 S. E. 303 (1921) ; Scott Auto &
Supply Co. v. McQueen, 111 Okla. 107, 226 Pac. 372 (1924) ; Bank of California
Nat. Asso. v. Schmaltz, 139 Or. 163. 9 P. 2d 112 (1932).
"delit Storage Co. v. Kingsbury, 76 F. 2d 978 (D. . Cir.), modified on
other grounds, 79 F. 2d 705 (D. C. Cir. 1935) ; Kravitz v. Parking Service Co.,
29 Ala. App. 523, 199 So. 727, cert. denied, 240 Ala. 467. 199 So. 731 (1940). This
is the English common law holding; except where modified by statute, an ordinary
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parties must be given freedom of contract.19 This view does not seem
to be supported by reason, however, as it is a generally recognized
principle that freedom of contract is always controlled by considerations
of public policy20
In the instant case, the great disparity of bargaining power was
recognized, the court pointing out that the conditions were predeter-
mined in favor of the bailee. 21 Thus, the court's reasoning that a profes-
sional bailee in such a position cannot contract away his liability is
clearly supported by the weight of authority and reason.
JAmE:s M. HOLLOWELL.
Charities-Liability for Torts of Employees
Liability is generally incurred by employers for the negligent conduct
of their employees in the course of their employment.' However, at
bailee may contract to limit his liability for negligence. Van Toll v. South Eastern
R. R. Co., 12 C. B. N. S. 75, 142 Eng. Reprint 1071 (1862); Rutter v. Palmer, 2
K. B. 87 (1922). "The Federal courts permit the private bailee to limit his lia-
bility for negligence, but do not extend this privilege to public bailees, as it is con-
sidered that such an extension would be contrary to public policy." Note, 8 N. C.
L. Rav. 282, 284 (1930). But in Note, 86 U. PA. L. Rlv. 772, 774 (1938), it is
stated that ". . . the Federal courts . . . have upheld conditions exempting bailees
from responsibility for negligence and have found that they violate no rule of pub-
lic policy." Both cite McCormich v. Shippy, 124 Fed. 48 (2d Cir. 1903). However,
the court there states, "There is no question of public policy involved. It is well
settled that the parties in such a case have the right to provide by apt language
against liability for negligence." It appears that the view expressed in The Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review is correct. See Inland Compress Co. v. Sim-
mons, 59 Okla. 287, 159 Pac. 262 (1916).
1" See Munger Auto Co. v. American Lloyds of Dallas, 267 S. W. 304 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924) (where the court held that the due process clause of the state
constitution guaranteed the right of a garage keeper to make a contract limiting
liability). See Note, 175 A. L. R. 12, 135 (1948).
21 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§574, 575 (1932).
S,,... the constantly increasing number of automobiles render[s] the question
of parking a matter of public concern .... People who work in the business sec-
tions of our cities and towns and who rely on automobiles for transportation find
it difficult-sometimes impossible-to locate a place on the public streets where daily
parking is permitted. They are driven to seek accommodation in some parking
lot maintained for the service of the public. There they are met by predetermined
conditions which create a marked disparity of bargaining power and place them
in the position where they must either accede to the conditions or else forego the
desired service." Miller's Mutual Fire Insurance Assoc. v. Parker, 234 N. C. 20,
24, 65 S. E. 2d 341, 343 (1951).
1 Liability is based on the respondeat superior doctrine. The reason for the
doctrine is that it is more just to make the person who has entrusted his employee
with the power of acting in his business responsible for injury occasioned to an-
other in the course of so acting, rather than leave the other, an entirely innocent
party, to bear the loss or attempt a usually inadequate recovery from the employee.
Schedivy v. McDernott, 113 Cal. App. 218, 298 Pac. 107 (1931) ; Phillips v. West-
ern Union Tel. Co., 270 Mo. 676, 195 S. W. 711 (1917) ; Bernstein v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 174 Misc. Rep. 74, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 856 (1940); Wright v. Wright,
229 N. C. 503, 50 S. E. 2d 540 (1948) ; Hammond v. Eckerd's, 220 N. C. 596, 18
S. E. 2d 151 (1942); West v. F. W. Woolv.orth Co., 215 N. C. 211, 1 S. E. 2d
546 (1939).
1951]
